Singapore investigators wanted records from an American server supplier to test what companies had declared about their purchases. Their government’s November 12, 2026, statement explained why: the machines had passed through Singapore to Malaysia, and police were investigating whether they had then moved to another destination. Local declarations alone could not answer that question. 1
The inquiry included Megaspeed International Pte. Ltd., a company incorporated in Singapore, and its controllers. The supplier whose records Singapore sought was Supermicro, a U.S.-based server company. A separate U.S. investigation involved Nvidia, the American chip designer whose processors equip powerful AI computers. The public accounts show investigators following different parts of a transaction: a purchase, an export declaration, a physical shipment and its eventual destination. 2
Those distinctions matter to the market in which the Lutnick family’s financial business operates. Cantor Fitzgerald, the U.S. financial group based in New York and controlled by Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick’s children, has a commission contract to sell shares for Bitdeer. That company, incorporated in the Cayman Islands and headquartered in Singapore, is developing overseas AI computing services. It is a different operator from Megaspeed. Cantor’s mandate places the family’s bank at the financing end of a market whose customers and equipment are subject to the father’s department. 3
Two investigations met in Singapore
Commerce and Justice gave their account of the U.S. investigation in a joint statement published on November 17, 2026. Commerce had identified suspicious activity through monitoring for potential semiconductor diversion and opened an investigation into Megaspeed in 2024, they said. In May 2025, investigators requested Nvidia records concerning direct or indirect sales to Megaspeed. The request therefore concerned transactions across a supply chain, including sales through intermediaries. 4
Singapore described an independent domestic inquiry. In February 2025, its police and customs authorities began investigating several companies and officers over potentially false declarations relating to server purchases. The Ministry of Home Affairs said this was not based on a request from another country. It investigated Alice Huang, also known as Huang Le, because she had been Megaspeed’s chief executive, chairperson and one of its key controllers. 5
The authorities’ work intersected on June 24, 2025. The U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security, Commerce’s export-control agency, conducted a voluntary post-shipment verification at Megaspeed with Huang present. Singapore said that was when it first learned of the U.S. interest in the company and Huang. Singapore police interviewed her that day and impounded her passport to secure her attendance during their investigation. 6
The joint U.S. statement also described an on-site check with Singapore officials in June 2025. It said Nvidia put Megaspeed on its no-sell list in June 2025. Commerce’s record request, the check and the supplier’s sales restriction are concrete actions the agencies place before the later controversy over Nvidia’s contacts with officials. 7
The records Singapore sought
Singapore said the servers had been exported through its territory to Malaysia without entering the Singapore market. Police were testing whether they had subsequently gone somewhere else, contrary to the declarations. Investigators needed to compare the companies’ statements with records from the countries where the servers originated and ultimately arrived. That required cooperation beyond Singapore’s own jurisdiction. 8
At a meeting on July 7, 2025, Singapore police and prosecutors asked U.S. authorities to help secure Supermicro’s cooperation. From September 2025, police repeated that request to Justice and the FBI. The ministry said Supermicro had provided limited cooperation and that, by its November 12, 2026, statement, Singapore had received limited information or assistance concerning the company. This was Singapore’s published assessment of the assistance it received. 9
Nvidia’s contacts with Commerce became a separate part of the public dispute. Bloomberg reported, in an account published by The Business Times on November 10, 2026, that Nvidia general counsel Tim Teter contacted Jeffrey Kessler, the Commerce official overseeing BIS, in late summer 2025. According to that report, Teter asked whether BIS had been involved in Singapore’s detention of Huang. He subsequently sought a meeting with enforcement staff. Staff initially declined and forwarded his message to Kessler, who directed them to proceed by the book, the report said. It also said, citing people familiar with the case, that Justice asked BIS to pause its efforts in late 2025. 10
Nvidia said it consulted officials to provide information, seek instructions and combat diversion. BIS defended its enforcement. The accounts describe a company trying to engage the regulator during an investigation and the regulator’s stated approach to that contact. The reported staff forwarding is part of that account, rather than a direct email from Teter to Kessler. 11
The decisions concerning Huang
Singapore’s statement separates the server-declaration investigation from what Huang told investigators about her own role. In February 2026, police and prosecutors concluded that there was insufficient evidence to establish that she had committed offenses relating to the possible inaccurate declarations under investigation. 12
Police separately assessed that Huang knowingly supplied inaccurate information to downplay her role in Megaspeed. She received a stern warning and was barred from re-entering Singapore. Her passport was returned on February 26, 2026, and she left that day. The ministry said she had not been investigated for espionage and that the investigation into Megaspeed and six other individuals remained ongoing. These were different findings about different suspected conduct. 13
The U.S. agencies’ November 17, 2026, statement described an ongoing criminal investigation led by Justice after Commerce’s enforcement action. It did not date the handover. They defended Commerce’s work under Lutnick and said the departments would pursue any criminal conduct. The statement supplies the agencies’ account of their actions; it does not announce an adjudicated finding against Megaspeed. 14
The business affected by verification
Overseas computing services make the user as important as the hardware’s location. Bitdeer’s November 10, 2026, results describe its planned Malaysian facility, A201, with commitments exceeding 70% of capacity and more than $1.7 billion of projected revenue over five years. Its business would sell computing to customers over a network. The capital-raising contract gives Cantor a conditional commission opportunity as that company develops its services. 15
The remote-access rule BIS released on November 16, 2026, addresses covered access to computing abroad, including the customer’s headquarters and ultimate parent. It provides a licensing transition for qualifying existing services, with effectiveness scheduled on publication, planned for November 19, 2026. BIS credited Treasury and the National Security Council with writing and directing it. Commerce administers the system. These rules add customer and service checks to a market already requiring investigators to trace physical equipment across borders. 16
The enforcement record shows the work those checks require: records from suppliers, comparison with export declarations, visits to business premises and coordination among governments. In this market, Cantor’s financial opportunities depend on clients obtaining capital and developing services customers can use. The family controls the bank helping raise that money; their father’s department oversees the American technology and its permitted use. 17
Source notes
- Singapore Ministry of Home Affairs, paragraphs 5–6. ↩
- Singapore account, paragraphs 2–6, joint U.S. agency statement. ↩
- Family control, Bitdeer corporate information and commission terms. ↩
- Joint statement, first page. ↩
- Singapore account, paragraphs 2–3. ↩
- Singapore account, paragraph 4. ↩
- Joint statement, first page. ↩
- Singapore account, paragraph 5. ↩
- Singapore account, paragraph 6. ↩
- Reported contacts. ↩
- Company and bureau responses. ↩
- Singapore account, paragraph 7. ↩
- Singapore account, paragraphs 3 and 8–9. ↩
- Joint statement. ↩
- A201 project row, commission terms. ↩
- Released rule, section 744.24, BIS announcement. ↩
- Bitdeer capital-raising terms, ownership and control filing. ↩